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Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context

Neil Walker

1. Three Forms of Scepticism about Constitutional Pluralism

Constitutional pluralism divides opinion. Those features that make it attractive to
some in a globally connected world also account for the scepticism it provokes in
others. The allure of constitutional pluralism lies in its ambition to square two ideas –
‘constitutionalism’ and ‘pluralism’ - that are typically understood as quite distinct and
presumptively incompatible, or at least as of limited compatibility. On the one hand,
the idea of constitutionalism – of a legal code that supplies a legitimate foundation
and framework for our common forms of political life – has been traditionally
understood in unitary and hierarchical terms. That is to say, it is taken to refer to a
single, bounded, and ultimately indivisible ‘unit’ - paradigmatically the state – and to
do so in terms of an unbroken chain of authority and an encompassing legal ordering. 1
On the other hand, when we speak of pluralism, whether we are concerned with a
‘first order’ pluralism of social constituencies, 2 or of institutions,3 or of values, 4 or of
value sets and world-views, 5 or - of most direct immediate relevance – with a ‘second

1

See e.g. D. Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, (2005) 12 Constellations
447; M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World?
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 258-325.
2
See e.g. R. A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” (1957) 2 Behavioural Science 201-215
3
See e.g. V. Bader, “Religious Diversity And Democratic Institutional Pluralism (2003) 31 Political
Theory: 265 - 294.
4
See e.g. I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberalism (Oxford: OUP, 1969)
5
See e.g. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996); R. Bellamy,
Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (London: Routledge, 1999).
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order’ pluralism of legal and political systems as a whole, the emphasis is always
upon multiplicity and diversity and upon the non-hierarchical terms of the recognition
and accommodation of that multiplicity and diversity.

In crude terms, the

constitutional pluralist seeks to retain from constitutionalism the idea of a single
authorizing register for the political domain as a whole while at the same time
retaining from pluralism a sense of the rich and irreducible diversity of that political
domain.
For the advocate of constitutional pluralism, moreover, the attraction is a
matter both of fact and of value - of the force of circumstance as well as of preference.
The fact that the constitutional landscape today - in our post-Westphalian age where
globalizing economic, cultural, communicative, political and legal influences have
both spread and diluted public power - is no longer organised into mutually exclusive
nation state domains but instead occupies much overlapping transnational space,
cannot help but alter our understanding of constitutional ordering. It means that, at
least as the constitutional pluralist views the world, it becomes increasingly difficult if
not impossible not to conceive of the environment of constitutionalism in non-unitary
terms – as a place of heterarchically interlocking legal and political systems. 6 The
dimension of value lies in viewing this changing landscape not as a threat to the
maintenance of the traditional template of constitutionalism but as a welcome
opportunity to integrate what in conventional constitutional wisdom tend to be treated
as contrasting and even opposing modalities of normative thought. The constitutional
pluralist, in short, seeks to make a virtue out of necessity
For the sceptic, on the other hand, any such sense of opportunity can only be
the product of wishful thinking. Rather than achieving the reconciliation of opposites,
6

On the descriptive dimension of constitutional pluralism, see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional
Pluralism” (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317.

3
constitutional pluralism is always poised to collapse under the weight of its internal
contradictions. And if it does so, this will not signal a new constitutional dawn.
Rather, it will imply, at best, a retreat to a state-centred constitutional orthodoxy, and,
at worst, the degrading or even the exhaustion of the constitutional paradigm as a
whole in the late modern age. More specifically, for the sceptic there are three
potential structural weak-points, and so three points of possible implosion, within
constitutional pluralism. A consideration of

each allows us to introduce three key

challenges.
In the first place, constitutional pluralism may, on closer inspection, simply
mutate and settle into a new form of constitutional monism or singularity. That is to
say, the tendency towards unity and hierarchy in constitutional logic and in the
constitutional mindset may be strong or even incorrigible, and if this is so then new
constitutional initiatives, practices or world-views that reach into the transnational
sphere will tend to adopt the form of the statist original. Whether we are talking about
the constitution of the European Union, or the United Nation’s ‘world order’
constitution, 7 or even the informal ‘higher order’ constitution suggested by the
elevated status of certain contemporary international law norms, 8 what we see
wherever and whenever constitutionalism is invoked beyond the state, and whatever
its ostensible commitment to openness and sustainable diversity, is a tendency
towards a new manifestation of closure and a new reduction to unity; towards the old
familiar of everything deemed constitutional being contained - ‘constituted’ indeed within the one hierarchically layered legal and political system. 9 There is no room in

7

See in particular B. Fassbender ‘The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International
Community’, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of International Law, 529.
8
See e.g. E. De Wet “The International Constitutional Order”, (2006) International and Comparative
Law Quarterly. 55, 51-76
9
See e.g. D. Kennedy, “The Mystery of Global Governance” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling
the World? 37-68; M. Koskenniemi “The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
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that perspective for the unresolved heterarchical configuration or the open-ended
jurisdictional extension of a constitutionalism decoupled from a singular legal and
political order.
In the second place, and conversely, traces of constitutionalism beyond the
state may be viewed not as an extension and mutation that will ultimately take the
form of a new and encompassing unity, but, just as in the classic age of the
Westphalian state system, as a series of separate reductions. On this view,
constitutional pluralism turns out to be nothing more than constitutional plurality.
That is to say, the flip-side of the structural tendency of constitutional framing to
provide the bounded and hierarchically ordered legal space of the state may be that if
anything is to escape such a space but still be considered as properly ‘constitutional’
in character, it can only do so on the basis of its belonging to a quite distinct and
unconnected bounded and hierarchically ordered constitutional entity. For if
constitutional norms operate according to a singular and hierarchical regulatory logic,
then there is simply no conceptual scope for any heterarchical legal relations that
operate between distinct constitutional singularities to possess its own properly and
distinctly

constitutional character, or at least not from the perspective of these

constitutional singularities themselves. In other words, if we seek to distinguish the
overlapping and interlocking of constitutional orders from mere constitutional
plurality or diversity on the basis that it involves a commitment to the common
recognition and accommodation – and to that extent the integrity - of the diverse parts
notwithstanding their diversity, then the exhaustiveness of each of the different
constitutional orders in their own terms means that we lack the requisite
constitutional code operating independently of the overlapping and interlocking
Politics” (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1; E. Christodoulidis, “Constitutional Irresolution: Law and
the Framing of Civil Society” (2003) 9 European Law Journal 401.
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constitutional orders in which any such transversal integrity can be registered. 10
Whether we are dealing with the new type of relations between the constitutional
orders of states and that of the supranational EU, or between NAFTA and the states of
North America, or the UN and the states of the world, or amongst the various
emergent non-state polities, or whether we revert our gaze to the ‘old-fashioned’
terms of exchange between different states themselves, therefore, on this view the
idea of meaningfully constitutional relations between distinct constitutional orders is
simply incoherent.
In the third place, if and to the extent that it is nevertheless possible to think of
relations between different legal entities as pluralist in quality, and not simply
collapsing into either the monolithic discipline of constitutional singularity or the
mutual indifference of constitutional plurality, then this may be precisely because the
entities in question do not possess or claim just such a constitutional character. If we
want to conceive of different legal entities within the increasingly fragmented global
archipelago as connected in ways which remain legally meaningful without these
legal relations resulting in such entities being ultimately subsumed within a single
legal order, the development of the requisite legal imaginary may only be possible if

10

There are in fact two closely related if apparently quite distinct versions of this concern or criticism.
One - closely associated with a certain type of approach which remains presumptively sympathetic to
constitutional pluralism - raises the prospect that there is simply nothing left to say in constitutional, or
indeed in any kind of legal terms, about the relations between constitutional orders which are each
already conceived of in a bounded manner. Here, the danger is that constitutional pluralism is left
conceptually barren. This so-called radical pluralist approach is further considered in Section 2 of the
text below. A second criticism, presumptively unsympathetic to constitutional pluralism, holds that an
acceptance of the pluralist scenario is likely to lead not to a conceptual void in the law, and so to a
domain of non-law, but to a situation of overabundance. For if constitutional pluralism simply alerts us
to a plurality of legal order unities, then rather than an absence of legal answers to difficult questions in
areas of overlapping jurisdiction what we have, strictly speaking, are too many answers, each valid
from its own systemic perspective. Which law happens to prevail in practice becomes a matter of
circumstance rather than principle, and the law as a whole in the area of contested overlap may thus
come to lack predictability or a coherent framework of justification. See e.g. J. Baquero Cruz, “The
Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement” (2008) 14 European Law Journal 389;
P. Eletheriadis, “Pluralism and Integrity” (2010) 23 Ratio Juris .
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we dispense with the constraining and increasingly anachronistic language of
constitutionalism as an appropriate characterization of such entities. 11
To recap then, constitutional pluralism may be rejected either on the basis that
its pluralist credentials do not add up – that it is ultimately (i) either monism with new
and wider horizons or (ii) mere plurality – or on the basis (iii) that if it is genuinely
pluralistic then this is at the expense of its specifically constitutional quality. Taken
together, these three challenges introduce a formidable range of arguments against
constitutional pluralism in the new global context. In what follows, I will examine
how different theories of the global regulatory configuration stand in relation to
constitutional pluralism and its critique – whether as explicit advocates of one or more
of the three key challenges to constitutional pluralism, or at least as assuming a
position consistent with such challenges; or, alternatively, as taking a position that
invites one or more of such challenges; or as actively addressing and responding to
such challenges.
Before doing so, however, I want to say something about the implications of
the fact that constitutional pluralism was first developed in the European
supranational theatre rather than in the wider global arena. On the one hand, the
particular terms of the European debate accounted for much of the early buoyancy of
constitutional pluralist thinking and for its readiness to rise to the sceptical challenge.
On the other hand, by developing the theoretical perspective of constitutional
pluralism in conditions that were unusually favourable, this regional concentration has
skewed the terms of debate. And in so doing it has retarded – or at least left untested the capacity of constitutional pluralist thinking to confront the full weight of the

11

See in particular the work of Nico Krisch; “Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional
Ambition” In P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: OUP,
2010) 245-266; “The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law” LSE Legal Studies Working Papers
12/2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418707
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sceptical challenge in the wider global context. Nevertheless, I will argue in the
concluding sections that, for all its over-reliance on the European context, and for all
the difficulties posed by the broader transnational regulatory environment, there
remain today good arguments for pursuing the project of adapting the language and
mindset of constitutionalism to meet the pluralist imperatives of broader global
conditions. In making this argument, I want to stress that what matters is not the label
‘constitutional pluralist’ – overused and overstretched, and unworthy of its implicit
claim to constitute a single School of thought 12 - but the basic intellectual sense that
it remains worth thinking and talking

about the architecture of

global law in

constitutional terms.

2. Constitutional Pluralism in Europe

The idea of constitutional pluralism derived a lot of its initial focus and momentum
from the circumstances of high-profile constitutional clashes over the implications of
Europe’s supranational arrangements. The key sites of these clashes were the supreme
or constitutional courts of the member states. Faced with

issues such as

the

compatibility of new instruments of supranational authority with national standards of
human rights, 13 the reconciliation of

a

Treaty-by-Treaty expansion of overall

supranational jurisdiction into areas of public policy traditionally associated with the
nation state with the basic idea of national democratic control, 14 the tension between
12

On which see J. Weiler, “Prologue – Constitutionalism – Global and Pluralist” in G de Burca and
J. Weiler (eds) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) .
13
See e.g. Internationae Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel [1974] 2 CMLR 540
14
See e.g. Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. This landmark case concerned the
constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, but every subsequent European Treaty, including the
abortive Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty which succeeded it, has likewise given rise to
litigation in national constitutional or supreme courts. For reflection on the decisions of the German
and other top courts prior to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, see, for example, the special issue of the

8
accession to a mature transnational polity and a minimum sense of sovereign selfdetermination, 15 or the extent to which transnational security concerns may encroach
on core national responsibilities in criminal justice, 16 national courts have in a
prolonged series of high profile cases been required to adjudicate on the basic source
and conditions of final constitutional authority in contexts where the states and the EU
palpably possessed overlapping competence. And in so doing, these national courts
have tended to affirm or to develop conceptions of constitutionalism which, in
stressing or assuming the autochthonous quality of state constitutional authority and
the national distinctiveness of its content, have been prepared to countenance the
claims to authority emanating from the judicial organs of the EU only on their own
nationally conditional terms and not on the absolute terms set or assumed by the EU
itself
As an account of these cases and of their context of emergence and reception,
constitutional pluralism has an immediate plausibility. If we take the three core
challenges in turn, to each of these the European case has offered a strong prima facie
answer. In the first place, the European example is one where, whatever fears may be
expressed in different quarters about the overweening ‘constitutional’ ambitions either
of the member states or of the EU itself, the diversely-sourced and wide-ranging
invocation of the language and logic of constitutionalism in the face of legal and
political contestation shows no realistic prospect of being resolved in terms of a newly
minted, widely accepted and broadly effective constitutional unity. The relevant
organs of the EU remain implacable in their own claims to self-standing legal
German Law Journal (2009) Vol. 10 No. 8. available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=2&vol=10&no=8
15
See e.g. Polish member of the European Union (Accession Treaty) K18/04, 11th M<ay 2005. see
more generally, W. Sadurski “Solange Chapter 3; Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – democracy
– European Union” (2008) 14 European Law Journal 1-35.
16
See e.g. the various decisions on the legality of the European arrest warrant, discussed in Cruz, n10
above.
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authority and in the invocation of a constitutionally familiar language and ethos of
primacy-with-an-integrated-legal-order, but equally, the relevant constitutional organs
of the 27 member states continue to make plausible and robust claims to their own
original and final constitutional authority for all matters within their national purview,
including the jointly designed supranational edifice. 17
In the second place, however, this does not mean that the European
supranational domain is easily categorized merely as a plurality of constitutional
unities without a plausibly constitutional connection. Institutionally, we can point to a
number of bridging mechanisms which in the round provide more intimate terms of
communication and exchange between the relevant state and the non-state legal
entities than is the case in any other postnational setting.

If we consider the

provisions for the direct domestic applicability (in the case of regulations) or
compulsory transposition (in the case of directives) of supranational legislation as
well as for its judicial enforcement, for the unmediated implementation of much
supranational administration through the Commission and various European agencies,
and for the obligatory (preliminary) reference of questions of the authoritative
interpretation of supranational law from national to supranational courts, it is clear
that both within and across the three key constitutional departments – legislature,
executive and judiciary - there is close structural linkage between national and
supranational sites of authority. Culturally, too, there is a thick familiarity of national
constitutional heritages, one nurtured and reinforced by the gradual development first

17

In an earlier article I coined the term ‘epistemic pluralism’ to emphasize the fact that ‘descriptive
pluralism’ in the European context had a deep, hermeneutic quality. That is to say, pluralism is
appropriate here not just as an external description of the constitutional landscape, but is corroborated
and reinforced by the deepest role self-understanding of the key actors themselves; see N. Walker n6
above.

10
by judicial and then by statutory means of the idea of the ‘common constitutional
traditions’ of the member states as an active agent of convergence. 18
Of course, these concurrent structural and cultural forces do not automatically
transmute into constitutional matter. Indeed, as we shall see, 19 much of the debate
within constitutional pluralism has concerned what, if anything is possible, and if
anything is possible, what is necessary or desirable to complete the process of
constitutional alchemy. What is clear, nonetheless, is that the background conditions
for communication between different constitutional orders are comparably favourable
in supranational Europe.
In the third place, the argument that it is possible to conceive of constitutional
relations between the two levels of constitutional order – state and supranational –
cannot easily be defeated by the objection that the European level does not bring
‘true’ constitutional credentials to the table. For sure, the precise constitutional status
of the EU is heavily contested, in particular the qualities in which and the degree to
which the constitutionalism of the EU resembles that of the state. Indeed, much of the
political debate surrounding the eventual failure in 2007 of the EU’s first explicit
experiment in documentary constitutionalism concerned this very question.20
Alongside deep disputation of the detailed constitutional credentials of the EU,
however, there has in recent years grown up a consensus that the EU does nonetheless
possess a constitutional character of sorts. 21 In legal terms, with its doctrines of
primacy and direct effect and its overall development of an autonomous legal order,
and in institutional terms, with its dense and complex governance architecture of

18

See e.g. F. Balvesi. “The “Common Constitutional Traditions” and the Integration of the EU”;
available at: http://www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org/page/2006_n6/mono_02_Belvisi.pdf
19
See Section 3 of the text below.
20
See e.g., N. Walker, “Reframing EU Constitutionalism” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling the
World? 149-77.
21
On some of the reasons for this, see Walker ibid, 149-50.
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Commission, Council, European Council, Parliament and Court, the EU appears to
have a material constitution that is closely analogous to and often draws heavily from
the state tradition. It may lack many of the background factors normally associated
with a ‘thicker’ “foundational” Constitutionalism and with a self-conscious political
baptism 22 but few today would deny it certain ‘thinner’ but still highly familiar
constitutional credentials. 23 Importantly, then, the sheer constitutional familiarity of
the European set-up has diverted attention from what might be regarded as a key
question. Especially as supranational Europe has matured as something broadly
understood as a distinctive polity rather than as a mere outgrowth and epiphenomenon
of other (state) polities, the emphasis has very much been on what kind of constitution
it can have – and in particular how close to the state template – rather than whether it
can have a constitution at all. In other words, for the most part the focus has come to
rest on which of various diverse or graduated conceptions of constitutionalism is
appropriate rather than on the threshold applicability of very constitutional concept. 24
These various factors have come together to provide a kind of regional
comfort zone for the ideas of constitutional pluralism. The co-existence of a number
of sites of undeniably significant legal authority making overlapping and inconsistent
claims over the nature, scope and implications of their various jurisdictions, and the
fact that these different sites are broadly understood by actors and observers alike as
‘constitutional’ in quality, provides a ready set of answers to the first and third
challenges. The second challenge – concerning the prospect of properly constitutional
relations between and across constitutional units as opposed to the mere coincidence
22

Which, of course, a successful documentary constitutional process would have sought to provide.
Although some who would not deny these credentials would still argue that the best way to
understand and augment the relations between the different levels with the EU is by reference to a
pluralist perspective which excludes the language of constitutionalism. See, e.g. M. Avbelj, present
volume.
24
On the distinction between a concept and its various conceptions, see, e.g., R. Dworkin, "The
23

Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon", (1972) 18(8)The New York Review of Books, 27-35
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and contingent connection of their various and quite separate constitutional identities - is the most acute one. And, as it raises the question of the normative dividend of
constitutional pluralism, it is also, as already noted, the one that has excited most
discussion within the field. On the one hand, there are those, often labelled radical
pluralists, for whom nothing strictly constitutional can be said about the relations
between different constitutional entities, although the fact that they are constitutional
entities suggests that these relations may be conducted in terms which trade on
common sensibilities or a shared understanding of the strategic context of
interaction. 25 On the other hand, there are those who try to complete the process of
constitutional alchemy, whether by reference to universal constitutional principles and

25

See in particular, N. MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 118; though he later modified his view, reintroducing public international law as the tertium quid to
regulate relations between the national and the supranational levels. See his Questioning Sovereignty
(Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch 7. See also Walker n6 above. And see more recently, Walker, “Reconciling
MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of Practical Reason” (2011) 24(4) Ratio Juris.
My position then, as now, was that constitutional pluralism in the European theatre should be
conceived of in constructivist terms; as an open-ended normative prospect, but still nevertheless a
normative prospect. According to this vision, we begin with no set formula for somehow transforming
a plurality of overlapping constitutional sites into a ‘constitutionally reconciled’ legal space. There is
no guarantee of such reconciliation, nor are there already-existing general trans-systemic constitutional
norms in terms of which we can authorise that reconciliation. Rather, on the basis of certain common
sensibilities and a shared understanding of the strategic context of interaction we can envisage a
tentative and iterative convergence (but never a Gadamerian ‘fusion’) of horizons from different
system-specific starting points. This may include claims as to the universalizablity of certain norms,
but these are only ever more or less persuasive claims – capable of being rebutted or refined in the
context of ongoing exchange.
Of course, normative open-endedness this conceived does not necessarily imply normative fragility. If
the documentary constitutional experiment of 2003-5 had been successful, there would have existed –
as an institutional fact – a document known as a Constitutional Treaty. In terms of their own criteria of
recognition, both European courts (and other European institutional actors) and national courts (and
other national institutional actors) would have been bound to recognize this document as normatively
significant. Doubtless, the precise authoritative claim and status of such a Constitutional Treaty would
still have been much disputed; whether a constitution for the European level alone, and so strongly
authoritative only for European institutional actors (as national actors would likely have been inclined
to argue), or somehow inhabiting a trans-systemic normative space – and so strongly authoritative at
both levels (as European actors would likely have been inclined to argue). Nevertheless, for all the
unresolved questions of authority, a successfully ratified documentary Constitution, which was by no
means considered a remote possibility at the time, would have encouraged the development of a
‘thicker’ sense of trans-systemic constitutional normativity of the sort we seek to identify under the
label of constitutional pluralism.
In short, the constructivist message holds that constitutional innovation, whether or not by reference to
a new type of canonical constitutional text , creates its own (open-ended) dynamic and will succeed or
fail in its own terms rather than with reference to some prior model of constitutional orthodoxy.

13
values of a substantive and structural nature, 26 or by reference to jurisgenerative
features of the particular dialogue between the different constitutional actors, 27 or
indeed some combination of the two. 28
Yet the practical importance of this area of difference and disagreement in the
European context of debate should not be overstated. The underlying descriptive and
explanatory diagnosis is largely shared across the various pluralist perspectives, and
given the close cultural and legal—structural ties between the states and the EU, those
normative problems of reconciliation of the different orders that remain unanswerable
or disputed are treated as of ‘manageable’ dimensions – centred upon disagreements
between ‘top courts’ - rather than as fault lines affecting the overall configuration of
authority in the European legal space. This is not to say that constitutional pluralists
analysing the European field have been entirely blind to the fact that, just as there is
more to constitutions than constitutional courts, so too there must be more to relations
between constitutions than merely judicial difference and dialogue. For all their
awareness in principle of the involvement of other institutions, however, the majority
of commentators have in fact homed in on the courts as the most visible arena and the
clearest manifestation of the problem - an exotic but essentially treatable symptom
which tended to dominate consideration of the ailment as a whole. 29

26

See e.g. M. Kumm , “The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in
Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262; also n1
above
27
See e.g. M. Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action” in N.
Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 501-38
28
Arguably, Maduro (n27 above) combines the two approaches. For his more recent views, now
extended to the wider global context, see his “Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial
Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds)
Ruling the World?356-80.
29
This tendency has probably been accentuated by the fact that one of the more influential pluralist
thinkers, Miguel Maduro, has served as an Advocate General at the European Court of Justice, and has
delivered opinions which seem to reflect some of his academic thinking. See in particular, his opinion
in Kadi v Council of the European Union; Case C 402/05, delivered on January 18th 2008; available at
http://blogeuropa.eu/wp-content/2008/02/cnc_c_402_05_kadi_def.pdf.
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3. Constitutional Pluralism Beyond Europe
If we look at the prospect for the constitutionalisation of transnational sites and
relations beyond the EU, the challenges set out above are posed much more sharply
and insistently.

Faced with the proliferation of global institutions around the

permanent framework of the United Nations, of global and regional human rights
charters and standard–setting bodies, of new forms of regional economic organisation
beyond Europe, of functionally specialist regimes of global public authority in matters
such as crime, labour relations and environmental protection, and of private and
hybrid public-private forms of self-regulation and administrative capacity in other
areas of specialist practical and epistemic authority from global cyberspace to
international sport, constitutional pluralism finds itself in a less obviously receptive
environment. 30 So much so, indeed, that much of the broader literature on the global
legal configuration implicitly or explicitly rejects the ideas of constitutional pluralism,
while those approaches which seek to keep faith with constitutional pluralism and
adapt it to the global scene struggle to justify their approach and occupy a less
confident and secure position within the debate than they do in the European context.
Let us again look at each of the three sceptical challenges in turn in order to illustrate
these points.
If we begin with the question of the tendency of constitutionalism to embrace
all normative phenomena within a singular logic and encompassing framework, this
might seem the least likely ground of challenge to the

appropriateness of

To be fair, however, Maduro himself has stressed more than most the need to look beyond the courts to
broader institutional structures in order to understand pluralism in the round. See in particular, Maduro,
n27 above.
30
See, for example, N. Walker, “Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids; Mapping the global
disorder of normative orders” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373-96; M.
Rosenfeld, “Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism” (2008) 6
International Journal of Constitutional Law 415-456; P. Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance and Legal Pluralism” Osgoode Hall Law
School, Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy Research paper Series 21/2011.
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constitutional pluralism within the wider transnational context. After all, are the most
obvious features of the global legal landscape not precisely those that are
“disorderly”? 31 Rather than as a coherent whole, do we not think of the global legal
configuration as fragmentary, 32

as “polycontextual”, 33

as embracing a “strange

multiplicity”, 34 as part of the diverse and sometimes impenetrable “mystery of global
governance”? 35 And should we not, therefore, expect constitutionalism conceived of
in a global key to match and reflect this underlying deep diversity, thereby adopting a
sensibility that is pluralism-friendly?
In some influential quarters of transnational constitutional thinking, however,
just the opposite is the case. For some who want to take constitutionalism to the
global level, it is precisely as a reaction against and in response to these underlying
tendencies toward fragmentation. Constitutionalism is embraced just because it is
believed to have the capacity to re-impose order, to re-establish hierarchy, to
articulate and apply a comprehensible redesign. This steering ambition comes in
different

variants.

In

one

version,

the

singular

model

of

transnational

constitutionalism is institutionally located in the United Nations, its Charter
functioning as an ersatz written Constitution for the post-war world order. 36 In other
versions, the basis of constitutional order is lexical rather than institutional. In
particular, there are a number of strains of the so-called constitutionalisation of
international law, in which ‘international law’ is itself protected and projected as a
single juristic category. 37 Typically under this approach some types of international
rules such as customary international law, ius cogens, human rights law, ‘world order’
31

Walker, n30 above.
Koskenniemi, n9 above.
33
G. Teubner, “Constitutionalising Polycontextuality” (Unpublished paper).
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treaties and obligations erga omnes are deemed to have a special facility to organise
the international order in a ‘constitution-like’ way. Whether due to their generative
capacity, or their trumping quality, or their comprehensive reach, they stand apart
from and above other international rules and lend some measure of coherence and
integrity to the whole.
We should be careful not to overstate the unifying ambition of any of these
brands of global constitutionalism. They are far from suggesting a world state to
subsume and replace the category of nation states, and, indeed, rarely propose any
kind of top-loaded federal design. 38 As noted, their impulse tends to be reactive rather
than proactive, a limited ‘re-ordering’ response to the deepening anarchy of global
legal relations in world of ever more divergent and complexly overlapping
jurisdictions rather than a new and constitutive set of markings on a legal tabula
rasa. But these efforts do, nonetheless, continue to display distinct traces of a certain
kind of singular and hierarchical strain of juristic thought that is closely associated
with the tradition of state constitutionalism. The performative meaning of making a
claim about the global regulatory sphere in ‘constitutional’ terms is one of
authorization – indeed self-authorization. The language of constitutionalism is
resorted to not just as a familiar trope of the legal imagination but as a way to outrank
other rules and outflank other ways of conceiving of the global legal order. 39
Yet a self-defeating irony surely lurks within such a bold discursive move. On
the one hand, it is precisely the lack of any agreed and settled overall framework of
legal authority for the proliferation of new sites of transnational legal authority in the
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dense mosaic of global regulation that tempts a certain type of singular constitutional
discourse to fill the vacuum. On the other hand, if constitutionalism’s ambition is to
put its own claim to final authority beyond question, then the inherent disputability of
any and all “global metaprinciples of legal authority” 40 which underscores the
unsettled quality of the transnational legal sphere means that constitutionalism in this
singular mode cannot achieve its own ambition. What is more, just because of the
underlying lack of settlement or of agreed general grounds for the justification of
postnational constellation, any such singular constitutional discourse deserves to fail
in its presumption of unassailable authority.
In summary, there is a monistic strain in transnational constitutionalism which,
for all the comparative (to the state tradition) modesty of its remit, is fated to fall short
in its bid to place its own authority beyond question, and justifiably so. Yet it is an
active, and indeed growing, dimension of the discourse on transnational
constitutionalism, one which implicitly or explicitly sets itself at odds with the various
strains of constitutional pluralism, and one, therefore, which contributes to the overall
hostility of the regulatory environment to the very idea of constitutional pluralism.
This monistic strain, it follows, should be carefully distinguished precisely
from those other explicitly constitutional conceptions of the global transnational order
that seek to emphasize the diversity of transnational sites of authority. In these cases,
the second and opposite challenge – namely the reconciliation of plurality in terms
which remain at all constitutionally meaningful - comes into play, although, as we
shall see, the first challenge continues to lurk in the near background.
Those who stress the variety of the constitutional register at the global level, in
turn, can be further divided fall into different sub-categories. On the one side, there
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are those for whom pluralism, including a pluralism of constitutional sites and
relations, is an unavoidable and irreversible consequence of the functional
differentiation of world society. In a perspective closely associated with contemporary
systems theory, the ever increasing autonomy of the globally ramified spheres of
economy, ecology, science, education, health, sport, media, virtual communications
etc, is postulated as both consequence and reinforcing cause of the decline of the role
of the traditional politico-legal constitutionalism of the state as the effective container
of the various specialist sub-systems within a particular territorial demarcation.
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the demise of a comprehensive mode of politico-legal constitutionalism – of a
constitutionalism built around an idea of a self-contained community in which all
matters of ‘public’ interest are contested and resolved in common, need not mean the
end of constitutionalism tout court. Instead, in the systemic pluralist vision we are
witnessing
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constitutionalization”43 of the various specialist functional sectors is no longer
grounded in and reducible to the articulations either of state law or the orthodox
treaty regimes of international law, or indeed of any other canonical legal form. 44 The
new societal constitutions will continue to draw on these familiar juridical sources in
their continuous processes of reflexive self-organisation, but the basic impulse
towards self-constitutionalization and its governing logic is provided by the very
character and domain concerns of the functional specialism itself; by the methods
available within its special medium of practice – and to those actors implicated in that
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medium of practice - of communicating and realizing the forms of social power or
influence distinctive to that medium of practice.
A more modest and familiar version of this kind of functionally-driven global
constitutional pluralism can be found in the idea of ‘sectoral constitutionalization’.45
Here the focus is upon the institutional centres and their conventional legal
foundations rather than the functionally coded sites of practices as a whole. The
accent is on the hybrid ‘”treaty-constitutions”

46

of special international organisations

or regimes, such as the International Labour Organisation or the World Trade
Organisation. These are constitutive instruments for the legal domains in question,
not just in terms of providing an institutional and norm-generating frame and claiming
an original juridical authority, but also, and increasingly, in endorsing or encouraging
a broader form of erga omnes constitutional sensibility in terms of rights protection
for the individuals affected by the regimes. 47
To these positions the second challenge is a clear and pressing one. What
makes the basic plurality of constitutional orders they describe pluralistic in nature?
In what does the constitutional coherence between the parts consist? If as, Gunther
Teubner, the leading exponent of modern systems theory, declares, “in the sea of
globality there are only islands of constitutionality”, 48 where are the constitutional
causeways that connect these islands? The answer is not clear. If the emphasis is on
the specificity of the newly emergent societal or sectoral constitutions in the absence
of any corresponding newly emergent legal-political totality, then what, if anything,
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links these constitutionally justified specificities in constitutional terms is
problematic.
One part of the answer may depend on structural analogy. Arguably, a key
‘constitutive’

puzzle faced by the stakeholders of relatively autonomous global

subsectors and by those who occupy their various external environments, namely how
to balance the freedom of those most centrally concerned with and affected by a
practice to govern that practice against the need to limit its expansion into other
spheres and so to curb its tendency to encroach on the autonomy of others sectors of
social practice and their key stakeholders, is the functional equivalent under a globally
differentiated order of the traditional state constitutionalist concern to safeguard the
‘internal sovereignty’ of ‘the people’ while ensuring that their ‘external sovereignty’
did not compromise the internal sovereignty of others. 49 A second part of the answer
may, more straightforwardly, concern common transversal norms. In particular,
proponents of a differentiated form of global constitutionalism may argue that basic
human rights standards should prevail across different societal or institutional sectors
regardless of these cleavages. Indeed, on this view, the very proliferation of such
cleavages and the problems of achieving ‘thicker’ forms of democratic
constitutionalism in consequence serve to underline the importance of the alternative
protection provided by globally guaranteed human rights standards. 50 A third and
final part of the answer might concern the relational dynamics themselves. If the
global constitution is one of multiple and variable sectors, one in which the marginal
connections and relations between sites of governance become central rather than
peripheral, then perhaps there is some kind of underlying relational logic or, less
passively, perhaps there can be developed terms and patterns of constitutional
49
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exchange between these various sectors which can be accounted for or justified in
terms of some kind of defensible constitutional reason. At a minimum, does the
fragmentation of the transnational constitutional order into a heterarchy of sites not
permit and even encourage the development of some kind of framework of mutual
recognition and contestation, and of checks and balances between sites and their
different claims to authority? And does the complex cross-polity institutionalization
of a system of countervailing power not provide the basis from which pluralism can
be transformed into a recognizable set of constitutional virtues? 51
Certainly, there is in the approach of the ‘systemic’ constitutional pluralist
some recognition and endorsement of all such solutions. The claim to move beyond a
plurality to a pluralism of systems remains a precarious one, however. It stands in
sustained tension with the sheer number, diversity, unpredictable emergence and
uncontainable evolution of the islands of self-norming and institutional capacity in the
new global constitutional archipelago. And it is in response to this and in an attempt
to fashion a more systematic and encompassing set of constitutional steering
mechanisms that we find another more universalist strain within global constitutional
pluralism. This thread of constitutional pluralist thought - closely associated with
Mattias Kumm 52 and others 53 - adopts a different and more resolute approach to the
tension between the two constitutional imperatives of the postnational constellation –
the autonomy of the particular parts and the coherence of the whole.
For Kumm, the modernist past remains the key to the future. The
philosophical core of constitutionalism has not changed since the advent of modern
constitutionalism through the medium of the maturing state system of late 18th
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century Europe and America. Crucially, what is constitutionally basic for him is not a
matter of institutional design but of underlying normative principles. These normative
principles flow from the basic modernist ambition of persons self-conceived as free
and equal individuals to act collectively to deliberate, develop and implement their
own conception of the common interest or public good. Such meta-political
foundations distinguish the modern age from the traditional hierarchies and the sense
of human society as in thrall to a prior order of things which characterize earlier forms
of social organisation and their associated social imaginaries. 54 And from these
foundations, according to Kumm, we can derive a set of universal constitutional
commitments to principles of legality, subsidiarity, adequate participation and
accountability, public reason and rights-protection. 55 Against this larger canvas the
traditional state-centred constitutional system assumes a more modest significance
than is often appreciated within constitutional thought. It is exposed as but one
architectural representation of the underlying principles, rather than an exclusive or
dominant or even optimal template for constitutional government. Instead, under
conditions of intensifying globalization the basically cosmopolitan texture of a
constitutionalism committed to universal principles becomes more apparent, and the
state is now but one constitutional player on a wider stage. As free and equal persons
operating under certain constraints of interest, information, geography and affinity,
we continue to respect particular contexts of decision-making and public interest
formation, and the principles of subsidiarity, participation and accountability
recognize this. However, as free and equal persons we are also categorically
committed to acknowledgment of the freedom and equality of all others, and so to the
universalisability of our political condition. In this way, we can reconcile our
54
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commitment to particular polities and sites of authority with a belief in an overarching
normative framework which informs the terms of our various particular
manifestations of public authority. In the final analysis, the global division of the
world into particular polities remains inevitable but the particular form that such a
division takes is not so; rather, it is contingent upon shifts in the underlying circuits of
social and economic power.
By replacing institutional or lexical hierarchy with normative universalism,
Kumm, and those with similar visions, find a more robust answer to the second
challenge than is available to the systemic pluralists while avoiding the more obvious
dangers of constitutional monism. Inevitably, however, the idea of constitutionalism
as a single cloth, however divorced from traditional conceptions of hierarchy, brings
the first challenge very much back into the frame. Is such a confident claim on behalf
of constitutionalism – even if its focus is on general principles rather than a particular
vertical design of rules or institutions, not just one more hegemonic move on behalf of
a singular constitutional vision? And how genuinely pluralist can such a vision be if
its basic normative contours are settled in advance, even if only at the high level of
abstraction proposed by Kumm?
One author who has posed these questions more keenly and insistently than
most is Nico Krisch. 56 For him, it seems that constitutionalism in a global age

is

caught in a Procrustean dilemma. On the one hand, the kind of “foundational
constitutionalism” 57 well-known from the state tradition – the ‘thick’ variant based
upon the constituent power of the collective people living in a distinct all-embracing
political society – simply does not suit the more fragmented circumstances of the
global age. On the other hand, if we try to stretch and adapt constitutionalism to fit
56
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these new conditions we are faced with a series of unsatisfactory alternatives. Either,
in a first case, we retain something of the monistic legacy of constitutionalism – a
holistic architectural or (at least) intellectual vision which, in its excessive ambition
and self-assertion, lacks both legitimacy and plausibility in an age of global diversity.
Or, in a second case, we are guilty of a kind of constitutional dilution or corruption,
retaining the term ‘constitutional’ as an overstated or inappropriate label for an
entirely new type of institutional and normative complex. In particular, if, as is the
case with the systemic forms of pluralism, all we retain from the tradition of state
constitutionalism is a commitment to various of its ‘thin’ properties, - juridical
autonomy, an institutional formwork of checks and balances, and fundamental rights
protection - but without any plausible sense of an authoritative frame for locating
these within a single constitutional universe, then perhaps the constitutional label
becomes a mere placebo or distorting diversion. That is to say, constitutionalism may
become a source of complacency – a false promise and false comfort in a world that
no longer bends to its design, or a source of confusion – a category mistake in a
world that needs new categories. In either event constitutionalism threatens to become
an impediment rather than a guide in the search for optimal solutions to the question
of governing new configurations of social power.
This takes us directly to the third challenge and the alternative solutions
suggested by that third challenge. For pluralism to make sense as a normative register
for the contemporary global order – and bearing in mind the extent to which empirical
conditions of global regulation militate against anything other than a pluralist
understanding - then perhaps the ‘constitutional’ descriptor just has to be dropped. As
Krisch himself suggests, in the last analysis constitutionalism and the scale and
quality of the pluralist understanding adequate to the global age may simply be
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irreconcilable. 58 Perhaps, the best way of ensuring the pluralist virtues of mutual
contestation, recognition and adaptation and a complex framework of checks and
balances, conceived of as a modest framework of co-ordination between relatively
autonomous polities,59 is to detach them from a constitutional discourse which is
unsympathetic on either side of this delicate ambition; either in the strength of its
traditional championing of the autonomy of the parts or in its effort to conceive of the
new in terms of an idea of totality and integrity which also borrows from the old.

4. Pluralism and the Constitutional Legacy
So, what, if anything, does constitutional pluralism under conditions of globalization
have left to offer in the light of these challenges? This question is most profitably
addressed by adjusting our lens slightly and by approaching the constitutional
predicament from a somewhat different angle than above, and by taking note of a
clear bifurcation that has emerged in the use and treatment of constitutional ideas in
the global age.
On the one hand, as a source of doctrine the accumulated arsenal of
constitutional thought is treated in an ever more eclectic manner in the global age.
Constitutional doctrine is drawn upon for both epistemic and symbolic reasons – as a
rich resource of resilient ideas of good governance couched in a language which also
happens to carry a distinguished and potentially authority-inspiring legacy.

The

spread and adaptation well beyond the traditional container of the nation state of tried
and tested aspects of constitutional doctrine such as fundamental rights protection,
separation of powers and institutional balance, federalism and subsidiarity, due
process and natural justice, proportionality and balancing, or ‘hard look’ doctrines and
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requirements to give good reasons, speaks to a process of widespread “low
intensity” 60 dissemination. Constitutionalism becomes a mobile resource, a ‘thin’ and
footloose structure and stylization of norms used to qualify and dignify the emergent
sites of a new global regulatory structure of authority without being constitutive of
these sites in the ‘thick’ manner redolent of the nations state. Constitutionalism on this
view is a matter of detail, adding an older texture to new governance forms rather than
providing a formative inspiration.
On the other hand, we also find constitutionalism used as reference point for
the most encompassing (re)imagination of the global body politic. Whether in the
work of Habermas, or Teubner, or Kumm, or – even if he ultimately rejects the
constitutional label – of Krisch, constitutionalism provides a point of departure for the
broadest consideration of the nature and resilience of the modernist settlement in legal
and political thought. Again, as with constitutionalism as doctrine, constitutionalism
as imagination sends a reasonably coherent message – certainly at the highest levels
of abstraction reached by this broader mode of thought. Recall that, for Kumm,
constitutionalism is about the political promise of an unprecedented epoch in which
free and equal individuals make over society in their own terms; 61 or, as Habermas or
Krisch would have it, constitutionalism is about the development of the very idea of
public autonomy – about how individuals constitute themselves in public as a public
and with due regard to and in symbiotic relationship with their equal freedom in the
sphere of private autonomy; 62 or as Teubner would argue, constitutionalism is about
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the balance between the autonomy and self-limitation of different functional sectors
inter se in a differentiated order – with autonomy retained as a deep freedom and
equality-respecting ideal even as its emergent forms escape our received modern
distinction between a generically public and a generically private sphere. 63 In all
cases, constitutionalism serves as a reminder of modernity’s resilient ambition for the
collective self-constitution of the social and political world in a moral universe in
which the individual is the basic unit
Where constitutionalism as doctrine is about detail, constitutionalism as
imagination, by contrast, sets the broadest of horizons. Crucially, however, for all
their contrasting features, the two levels of constitutional discourse for a global age
share a common absence. Where constitutionalism as doctrine is too specific in its
various remits and too past-derivative to provide a key formative influence for the
new post-Westphalian sites of authority, constitutionalism as imagination for its part
is both too general in scope and substantive ambition and too dependent upon the
dominant procedural heritage of state constitution-making to provide a formative
influence for these new constitutional sites.
In other words, we are faced in post-Westphalian world with a situation in
which constitutionalism arguably flies too low or too high, either too dependent on
other forms or too independent of any particular forms. Why this is so is both
consequence and reinforcing cause of the changing structure of constitutional
authority in a post-state world. In the state tradition, the imaginative and the doctrinal
dimensions of constitutionalism tended to be closely aligned through the dimension of
constituent power. For constitutionalism in this mode was concerned as much with
formative influence – with the particular pouvoir constituant and the ideas of guiding
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purpose and ultimate justification associated with the making of political community
- as with the tool-kit of mechanisms through which the duly formed and constituted
authority - the pouvoir constitué – seeks through doctrine to express and represent its
constitutive source. State constitutionalism, in other words, was concerned both with
the framing of the particular sites of authority and with the detail of what was framed.
Constitutionalism in the state tradition, therefore, was always about treating the
‘spirit’ and the ‘letter’ of the law within a single frame of reference, about background
culture as well as foreground text, about the regulative ideal as well as the regulated
practice, about deep ‘second order’ justification as well as immediate ‘first order’
validity and technique. In short, it was about both imagination and doctrine, and about
how the imaginative and the doctrinal were closely joined and mutually nourished
through the container of the self-constituting and self-constituted polity. Certainly,
there was also a dimension to the constitutional imagination which was prepared to
reach beyond the state, which treated the constitutions of different and other free and
equal peoples as morally comparable and ethically associated units. But this global
dimension remained parasitic upon the more basic connection between the
imaginative and the doctrinal dimensions in the context of the state. 64
Crucially, the post-Westphalian world of constitutionalism severs this basic
connection between the doctrinal and the imaginative while often remaining in
retrospective thrall to the significance of such a connection in the high modern era of
state-centred constitutionalism. An appreciation of this point allows us to
reconceptualise and restate the various dilemmas of constitutional pluralism in global
context as flowing from the expectation to do too much with too few resources. The
low-flying constitutionalism-as-doctrine seems to claim too much, at least by
64
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implication, in using the historically formative register of constitutionalism to account
for a regulatory context in which such constitutionalism as is available is no longer
doing and can no longer do that formative work, but is instead merely supplying the
regulatory technology for an already and otherwise formed site of authority. Hence
the criticism that constitutionalism is tendentially but inappropriately inclined to
monism, and the related claim that the language of global regulatory pluralism finds a
more becoming modesty if the descriptor ‘constitutional’ is removed from the units
we seek to conceive of within the pluralist structure. Equally, however, the highflying constitutionalism-as-imagination presumes too much if it treats itself as an
encompassing meta-authoritative normative frame for the plurality of sites of global
constitutional authority. Rather, its claim and message is prior to the particular forms
of constitutionalism and the particular norms associated with these forms. What it can
offer is precisely not a higher-order or framing legal normativity – a kind of
constitutional super-doctrine - for that would presuppose a formative and framing
role which it does not possess and which it could not posses without claiming new
constitutional unity; instead, all it can offer is a deeper and normatively unrealized
form of constitutional pre-orientation.
If we return briefly to the special case of the European Union and its
inappropriateness as a paradigm for postnational constitutionalism more generally, we
may observe how the severing of the two registers of constitutionalism is here less
evident, and less evidently problematic. Constitutionalism-as-doctrine in the European
Union bears such a close resemblance to many state forms and remains so closely
connected to its statist roots that, as we have seen,

its ‘thin’ credentials are widely

respected, and also treated by many as a sound basis on which a pluralist connection
between the national and the supranational spheres of influence might be forged. And
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while there has been much controversy over just how much legitimacy this ‘thin’
constitutionalism supplies, and also about whether it can or should be supplemented
by a ‘thick’ foundational constitutionalism, at least the EU has developed in a
sufficiently state-like direction that the linking of the supranational constitutional
imagination to a recognizable politically constituent process has remained a viable
ambition for many – or at least did so until the demise of the Constitutional Treaty in
2007. In short, neither constitutionalism-as-doctrine nor constitutionalism-asimagination seem to be as disconnected from their traditional basis of support as they
do in the wider global sphere. Constitutional pluralism appears more plausible, as,
too, in some measure does the alternative of a new constitutional unity.
In the global context, in the absence of the lock of constituent power the two
levels of constitutional discourse are more clearly stratified and more palpably
incomplete in the absence of the other. Yet just as postnational constitutionalism in
general is not best understood in the paradigm of the European Union, postnational
constitutionalism beyond the European Union should not be discounted just because
in some respects its development compares unfavourably with that of the European
Union. For it does not follow from the misalignment of the two constitutional
discourses – constitutionalism-as-doctrine and constitutionalism-as-imagination - that
there is no value in seeking to preserve and develop the modern constitutional legacy
at either or both levels under conditions of contemporary global pluralism. Rather, it
seems that the continuing value of constitutionalism, and the basis for believing that
any such value outweighs its disadvantages,

lies precisely in the combination of

those answers it does still provide and those questions it raises in lieu of the answers it
can no longer provide.
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If we first consider constitutionalism-as-doctrine, as already noted we cannot
deny the value of the constitutional normative resource-set accumulated over the
period of political modernity, or its continuing applicability to non-state sites,
however partial, fragmented and “non-holistic” 65 many of these site are. The various
functionally specific and/or institutionally clustered points of non-state authority may
have come to resemble nodes in a global network, each made up of a complex mix of
internal self-regulation and diverse external regulation, rather than each providing a
self-contained regulatory universe of its own, as in the state tradition. 66 Yet many of
the same basic puzzles of governance are being addressed, and so much of the same
technology of governance remains appropriate.
This point is placed in sharp and reinforcing perspective when we turn to
reconsider constitutionalism-as-imagination. In one respect, this serves as an
orientating reminder of what should underscore and inform our puzzles of governance
in state or state-like holistic settings and non-holistic settings alike. The
constitutionalist vision recalls the abiding importance of the meta-political question of
how to generate, adjudicate and apply our common interest in accordance with our
common standing as free and equal persons, even in a post-state world in which the
subject, mechanisms and object of common interest are out of kilter, and where,
accordingly, ‘we’ increasingly do not get to address the common interest question in
its entirety in common. However, this paradoxical feature of the common interest
should not defeat but should guide our efforts to interpret the ‘letter’ of constitutional
doctrine in light of the ‘spirit’ of constitutionalism. The contextual appropriateness
and refinement of all of our particular inherited constitutional techniques, from rights
protection through doctrines of consultation and due process to our manifold methods
65
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for the devolution of legal power, should be informed by our adjusted sense of the
elusive but still vital centrality of the idea of common interests amongst equals in a
multi-centred world of overlapping and partial authorities.
Yet constitutionalism-as-imagination, as well as showing us how to keep the
cup of self-government half-full, is also salutary in underlining our sense that it is
half-empty. As well as serving as an important reminder of the deeper purpose of
particular constitutional doctrines and the flexibility of their application, it also
highlights what we no longer have or can guarantee to preserve. Constitutionalism-asimagination recalls to us that in a context of constitutional foundationalism our sense
of the political realm, of constituent power and of constituted power were linked
together in a continuous framing logic, but that the sorts of constitutional questions
we once posed and addressed within a joined-up political container now increasingly
arise in a manner so fragmented and loosely coupled that they threaten the very
promise of ‘the political’ as embodying our capacity to make over the world in our
own terms. Constitutionalism-as-imagination thus also functions as a kind of
“placeholder” 67 for what is in danger of being lost if we abandon our commitment to
think and act as authors of the constitutive conditions of political society - however
diverse and complexly intermingled the transnational societal reference of that
political society might be - and acts as a continual prompt for us to seek to retain that
aspiration, however formidable, and fashion its pursuit to our new circumstances.

5. Constitutional Pluralism?
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But even if in these ways constitutionalism in general does remain relevant to
the global conditions of late modernity, one last important question of language
remains. Does the kind of loosely aligned dual-pronged approach to the sustenance of
a constitutional discourse suggested here fit well with the particular perspective of
constitutional pluralism which provided the starting point for our analysis?
The answer is a mixed one. In one sense constitutional pluralism is a product
of the very structure of state-centred political modernity we are trying to look and
think beyond. It is an attempt to solve a problem that is becoming outmoded.
Constitutional pluralism, conceived of as idea of a constitutionally relevant
connection between self-authorizing constitutional sites, silently assumes something
like the statist template of constituent power as the legitimate basis for the selfauthorization of the post-national constitutional sites. If self-authorization
increasingly lacks that legitimation, however, the focus of our concern shifts to the
broader question of what form of legitimation is possible in place of or in
supplementation of site-specific self-authorization. 68 At the same time,

with the

weakening of the sources of internal, site-specific legitimation, our sense of the
constitutional ‘closure’ of the various sites is reduced, and so, in consequence, is the
puzzle of how such increasingly ‘open’ sites can relate to each other constitutionally.
In other words, the less site-specific we understand constitutional authority to be, the
less problematic we conceive constitutional movement across boundaries, and the less
sharply framed the original definitive questions of constitutional pluralism appear.
On the other hand, if we think of constitutional pluralism not as a series of
doctrinal or otherwise constitutionally relevant answers to the puzzle of how different
constitutions connect, but simply as referring to the continuing relevance of
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constitutionalism in locating and addressing the mix of empirical and normative
factors which contribute to the deep pluralism of the emerging global order, then it
certainly remains a relevant conceptual point of departure. Our understanding of
constitutionalism

may have been unbundled to a degree that make the original

Europe-centred debate about the constitutional “plurality of unities” 69 less
paradigmatic. Yet that very process of unbundling, and the new horizons of metapolitical debate it opens up, are strikingly indicative of the ways in which the
constitutional legacy remains relevant both as a path-dependent influence upon and as
a means of collective sensitization towards our complexly differentiated and
interconnected global order.
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